


SPECIAL
COLLECTIONS

DOUGLAS
LIBRARY

QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY
AT KINGSTON

KINGSTON ONTARIO CANADA





*With respectful Compliments
From
G. F. M. & Co.*

LETTER

TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

WILLIAM PITT,

ON

THE LATE ARRANGEMENTS

IN

ADMINISTRATION.

BY

TIMOTHY PLAIN.

LONDON:

PRINTED BY A. MACPHERSON, RUSSELL-COURT, DRURY-LANE;

For Jordan and Maxwell, 189, Fleet-street; T. Kim, Strand;

R. Ogle, Great Trench-st., Holborn; A. Macpherson,
Russell-court; and James Simpson, Edinburgh.

1804.

(PRICE ONE SHILLING)



A

L E T T E R

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

WILLIAM PITT, &c.

SIR,

THE subject which, next to that of invasion, has created most interest in the public mind since the late peace, may, without the fear of contradiction, be esteemed the formidable opposition to ministers, which has for some time been forming in both Houses of Parliament. That opposition, while it seemed to be without concert or understanding among the parties which composed it, did not, on that account, hold out less promising prospects to the people at large: They could not view it as a coalition for the sake of place, or emolument of office, but, from the unanimity of sentiment, unattended by any selfish or private consideration, which seemed to prevail, must have entertained the pleasing

hope, that such opposition was the result of an awakened conviction of the necessity of uniting, to rescue the country from the imbecile hands into which it had fallen. They must have been led to encourage the cheering consideration, that it was not from the hearts of the able, the learned, and the illustrious *alone*, that patriotism was, at such a moment, to be banished; but would naturally be induced to believe, that there was nothing inconsistent in supposing, that, while people of every rank were eagerly stepping forward in defence of their country, its safety could not be indifferent to those who had the greatest stake in its welfare, and whose enlarged views, and superior knowledge, must furnish them with more adequate notions of its danger, and of the means of averting it.

Impressed with such pleasing and enlarged views of the subject, the unanimity which seemed to actuate all the great political characters in both Houses of Parliament, could not fail to be highly gratifying to every lover of his country, and to every man who wished to see its resources properly employed, and its measures characterised by temper, prudence, energy, and decision. Experience had shewn that, from the present ministers, little was to be expected. Their councils had alternately been marked by irritation and precipitancy, and by irresolution, tameness, and submission. Their schemes had been defective; and their enterprizes futile, badly conceived, chimerical, and unfortunate. From

their downfall, therefore, every thing that was calculated to remove suspicion, and produce confidence abroad;—every thing that could tend to encourage unanimity at home;—every thing which could give us assurance of a speedy and honourable peace, or of a bold, energetic, and successful war;—every thing, in short, which the heart of every man in these kingdoms who had a head to conceive, or a tongue to express his feelings, could wish or desire; was likely to be accomplished.—The patriotism which burst forth in the manly and energetic harangues of you, Sir, and of almost every other character in Parliament to whom we had formerly looked up, and in whom every political jealousy and party prejudice seemed to have given way to a regard for the public safety, inspired into our minds that confidence which is at all times alone wanting to assure to Britons the certainty of success. We knew that, under such conduct, the war in which we were engaged would not be a war *ad internacionem*.—We knew that the calamities of it would not be continued longer than necessity required.—We felt that if there was a man in the kingdom who doubted of its necessity, such a junction must at once remove his doubts, and conciliate his feelings.—We assured ourselves that, in such hands, our dignity, honour, and independence would not be compromised;—and we felt confident that, under such auspices, if an honourable, just, and permanent peace could not be looked for,—vigour, energy, temper,

and resolution would equally characterise our councils, and place beyond the reach of doubt our security at home,—and direct our arms abroad.

With such sentiments, and drawing such pleasing inferences from the effects which the reality of them must naturally have produced, what sensations but those of engendering discontent and division, of encouraging suspicion and dissatisfaction where they already existed, and planting them where they had not yet taken root; can the blating of all these anxious hopes, at a period when they seemed to be fast approaching to maturity, be supposed to produce!—Yet, assuredly, by a step,—the consequences of which had not been attended to or known, on the part of a certain illustrious person, but which could not fail to flash conviction on your mind, even had not so many remonstrances, so many considerations, equally mortifying to you, as honourable to others, combined to remind you of them;—must these consequences be produced!

Mr. ADDINGTON'S administration.—I cannot call them the *late* administration, for, unfortunately, weak, inefficient, and equal to no single good effect, as you lately represented them, they, with the exception of yourself, form the whole strength and energy of your's—Mr. Addington's administration, I say, came into power at a period when the voice of the country loudly called for such a change as might at least hold out an opening for a pacification, it being obvious that no such object could be

attained under your auspices. For that administration the country is generally supposed to be indebted to you, the principal component parts of it being selected from among the underlings in your former administration. For the calamities, disgrace, and danger, therefore, which their arrogance and weakness have brought on us, we have you, in some degree, to whom to acknowledge our obligations. I would be doing you injustice, however, were I to insinuate that you imagined, at the time, that you were entailing so *lasting* a burden on the country. I have no doubt that, weak and inefficient as they have proved, you under-rated their merits, at least in the article of *perseverance*, and expected, that, after having executed for you the work which you found must be performed they would, without a struggle, again yield the reins of government to your superior wisdom and experience!—

If, in presuming you capable of being actuated by such feelings, I attribute to you an unworthy and selfish motive unjustly, you must not blame me, Sir, but your own recent conduct for the inference which I have drawn. The majority of the country, if they do not express their opinion, will, I assure you, think of you as I do.—You introduced Mr. Addington, and your other friends, into the first offices in the country;—offices which, from your experience of them, you must have known they were no qualified to fill.—You kept aloof, until the country, wearied out by the

constant proofs of incapacity which they exhibited, were prepared almost for any change.—You then came forward, occasionally assisting, and occasionally impeding them ;—till, at length, finding a powerful opposition formed, you enlisted yourself among that opposition, on all occasions ;—professed a liberality of sentiment towards your co-opponents which had not formerly characterised your conduct ;—became the loudest decrifier of your late friends ;—and having, by the united efforts of all the rank and talents in Parliament, accomplished their overthrow ;—have contrived to resume your former seat at the helm of affairs, unaccompanied by *any one* of those on the shoulders of whom you have effected your elevation !—So far, indeed, have you lost sight of the *only* object which a patriotic mind could have formed, namely, a *general union* of talent and worth, that you have even agreed to come into office, under the express stipulation of the *exclusion* of that man, to whom, in particular, the eyes of this country, and of the whole world, are at this moment directed, as the standard of talent and principle ;—of that man, who *alone* is calculated, from the character for moderation which he bears, to secure to us the confidence of the powers on the Continent ; and, by his energy and talent, to restore peace and tranquillity to Europe !

Not one of the noble and honourable characters who, in conjunction with you, deemed it necessary that, at so important a crisis, the energy of our coun-

cils should, as far as possible, be commensurate with the danger which threatens us, and who, on that principle, effected the overthrow of Mr. Addington, would countenance you in so unworthy and unpatriotic a conduct.—Not even your own private friends have been able, with all their partiality, to reconcile themselves to a measure which, if it do not involve us in greater calamity, can, at the best, be attended with no salutary effect. In this dilemma, and being unable to get any person who would connect themselves with an administration formed on such principles, you have been obliged, strange to tell, to give the lie to the expressions you, within the last three weeks, applied to ministers;—you have associated yourself with those very persons whom you, on a former occasion, wished to make your tools;—who then duped you;—whom you lately so unsparingly lashed for their incapacity, imbecility, and weakness;—and who, it was generally understood, were, on that ground, to be dismissed from the management of public affairs!

Is an administration, then, vamped up in this manner, to the exclusion of *almost the whole talent*, certainly to the exclusion of *all the principle* of the country,---for it has been proved that no man of principle will enter into it—to be the sole effect produced by the late important discussions in Parliament, and by the suspension of public business for the last three weeks?—Are the surmises of those who laughed at our folly, in supposing that you could

be actuated by *disinterested* motives, indeed to be realised?---Are all our expectations of a union of sentiment and talent, rank, worth, and principle, to be at once blasted?—Must the same scene which has been acted over and over again, for the last two years, once more be repeated, with equally little effect?—Is the only recompence which we are to receive for the disgrace and obloquy with which we have been lately loaded in the eyes of all Europe, to be a recommencement of an *inveterate war system*, conducted by an *inefficient* administration, headed by a person who has already acknowledged, by his conduct, that *no* power on the Continent will treat with *him*, acting along with men who, if his own assertions can be relied on, are totally inadequate to their situations, and do not enjoy the smallest spark of the confidence of the people of *this* country?—If this be the only change which we can expect, deplorable, indeed, is our situation! For two years we have neither been at peace nor at war; and now, ---without trying on what footing we stand,---without examining whether the mediation which we pledged ourselves to accept of may be successfully employed,---we at once throw off the pacific character, and headlong plunge into a war, which can only terminate, as the last did, by your resigning, Sir, after this country is completely exhausted, for the purpose of allowing some of your underlings to conclude a peace; or,---by the annihilation of either, or both of the contending parties.

Thus is this country condemned to be the sport of fortune. Her wars must be conducted by a man in whose principles her enemies have no reliance, and with whom, therefore, they will not treat; and, when she finds a peace necessary, she is destined to employ persons incapable either of carrying on a war, or of concluding a peace on a permanent or rational foundation!

That this, Sir, must be the case, if you come into office *alone*, or with the co-adjutors who have already condescended to embark their fortunes in so unpropitious a cause, you cannot but be sensible. Your conduct, when it was found necessary to put an end to the late war, is a proof of your own conviction of the fact. You knew that the enemy had no confidence in the sincerity of your professions, and, therefore, you retired for a season. No change in the ideas of foreign powers, respecting your political character, can yet have taken place. The contemptible waverings, and irresolution of Mr. Addington's administration may have disgusted them, but cannot have reconciled them to the overbearing and domineering tone by which your's was distinguished. From the arrangements, indeed, which you are now forming, they must rather expect alternate specimens of the one and of the other.

As, then, it cannot be disputed, even by yourself, that your return to power, *in the mode now arranged*, instead of conciliating the powers on the

continent to this country, will rather inspire them with the belief, that we have abandoned every sentiment of accommodation, and have returned to that war system which was understood to characterise your former administration, from which impression all ideas of mediation, or of acting in concert with us, will be at once thrown aside, let us consider what effect it will have on the minds of the people of this country.

In proceeding to this point, I would ask you, in the first place, to lay your hand on your heart, and to declare, on your conscience, if you really think the administration which *you* have formed *more efficient* than that which you so lately decried, as totally incapable of the management of public affairs!—Your modesty, unquestionably, would prevent you, in making this appreciation from setting a value on your own talents. In that situation I venture to affirm, that you must, without a moment's pause, and that justly, too, say — “*No! by no means so efficient!*” — How far the accession of your abilities may be calculated to turn the scale, all circumstances considered, I shall endeavour afterwards to shew. That, however, those men whom you have been able to induce, either from personal friendship, or from the attraction of place and power, to take part in your arrangements, are *not equal* to those whom you have so loudly declared altogether incapable, and have accordingly admitted, a bare glance at the

names which compose each list must be sufficient to demonstrate.

The only accession of any strength, and one which you, or *any* other minister, might assuredly have relied on, is Lord MELVILLE. The consistency of principle which this Noble Lord has maintained through the whole course of his long political life—never to decline an office when he could obtain it—must, in your present dilemma, have suggested him as a sure, valuable, and worthy colleague. But, is he more to be depended on, in a political storm, or does he possess greater talent than Mr. TIERNEY, whom you have lost?—Or will the public be induced to believe him better qualified for the office which he is to discharge, than the noble and gallant admiral who lately so worthily filled it?—Lords HARROWBY and MULGRAVE are the only persons of character who are said to have embraced your offers.—I do not pretend to estimate their merits; but, when to meet them, I make you a present of one whom you thought worthy of introducing into the office of prime minister, and his brother, also a member of the privy council, you cannot think I under-rate their abilities,—the other names which compose your new arrangement, such as Mr. W. Dundas, Rose, Long, &c. you surely cannot for a moment put in competition with Mr. Yorke, Mr. Bond, Mr. Bragge, &c. whom you have either dismissed as *inefficient*,

or who, after your public declaration to that effect, did not wish to retain their situations.

By what charm, then, has the remnant of this *despicable* administration, without any accession to its strength, which is not more than taken away by what it has lost, all at once become so vigorous and energetic?—I am far from disputing, Sir, that you are, *in yourself*, a tower of strength; or, if you chuse, that you are, as stated by the Marquis of STAFFORD in the House, of Lords, “*indeed a giant refreshed.*” With every respect, however, for your superior abilities—willing to allow them to be equal to what your warmest admirers would represent, I cannot admit that *you*, or *any one* man, however transcendent his abilities, can be sufficient, even in ordinary circumstances, to give efficiency to a *weak, imbecile, and totally incapable* administration!

Had your objections, and those of your friends in Parliament, been confined to a *single* act of misconduct, or to inefficiency in *any one* branch of the administration, the public might have been satisfied by knowing that the individual act had been remedied, or the inefficiency supplied. Did not you, however, and all those who supported you, maintain, that ministers were *totally* inefficient;—that they were weak and incapable in *every* department. In matters of finance—particularly the Property Act—they shewed

their want of skill.—Every measure adopted by them for our internal defence:—the Volunteer System—the Augmentation of the Militia—the Army of Reserve Act—were all equally objectionable and badly conceived.—The removal of the Militia from Ireland was ill timed and improper;—the augmentation of that force was injudicious, and would be attended with no salutary or immediate effect.—The naval department was equally neglected;—no ships of war were, as usual, building in private yards;—ministers were wearing out our ships of the line, without providing others to replace them;—large ships were not proper for opposing the flotilla of the enemy, but we ought to employ gun-brigs in that service.—In short, there was not a *single act* of their administration, which, in your opinion, did not betray the grossest ignorance, want of capacity, and mismanagement.—Do you suppose yourself equal to the discharge of every office in the kingdom? Will you be enabled to be constantly on the watch to make up for the want of capacity in the person at the head of *each* department?—Or, will your accession supply those persons with brains, with intellects, with enlarged and rectified views, and comprehensions, with vigour and energy?—Yet all of these measures, every step which they had taken, were warmly defended, and maintained to be the only proper measures, by those very persons with whom you have now associated yourself.—Are you

certain that your present associates have abandoned the pertinacity with which they formerly opposed you?—Will those “ *giants refreshed,*” who were so eager to meet a renewal of the contest, be willing to throw aside the veil, and to confess, that, for the sake of continuing in office, they are ready to sacrifice every sentiment and principle;—to admit their own *inefficiency*, as well as want of *honesty*;—and to confess that their *boasts* and *concessions* are alike true and sincere, and proceed from the same *patriotic* motive—*a desire to share in the good things of the state!*—That they possess no *principle*, no *sentiment*, no *judgment* of their own, but that they are ready to *say* and to *do*, to *act* and to *think*, as you shall instruct them!

All this, however, Sir, they must do, or you, on the other hand, must abandon those views and sentiments which you have lately expressed in Parliament. You must be content to proceed in the same *inefficient* system which you so violently decried, and to bolster up measures which you lately deemed *incurable*.

In either case the country must be equally shocked and disgusted—What a contemptible trick and imposition on the public feeling and understanding, must the new arrangements appear, when we learn that Lord Castlereagh, for instance, has stood up in the House of Commons, and moved, or has even acquiesced in, the postponement of the Army of Reserve Suspension Bill, which, *as a*

Member of the late Administration, he pertinaciously pushed on to the very last stage, notwithstanding every argument and remonstrance you and others could use against it. Or must it not, on the other hand, appear equally monstrous to see you, Sir, standing up, *as Minister*, and moving the third reading of that Bill, which, *when out of Office*, you so vehemently opposed?—With what colour of consistency, or, even, with what appearance of integrity, can the “*Giants refreshed*,” in the House of Lords, consent to the repeal of the Two Irish Militia Bills, which they so *gallantly* supported? Or, can you, Sir, without incurring an imputation equally strong against yourself, allow those Bills to continue in force?—A noble friend of your’s, (Lord Mulgrave) who, it is said, is to be one of your colleagues, in arraigning the conduct of the late Ministry, did not deny them the character of honest men, but asserted that he would prefer a Ministry possessed of *less integrity*, with *greater ability*.

It is a painful consideration to think that this alternative should be necessary in Great Britain, in which we have hitherto been vain enough to believe that the greatest ability might be found, combined with the highest integrity. I am afraid, however, that, as matters now stand, the object of the Noble Lord has not been attained, even under the burden with which he was willing to have it accompanied. We may, indeed, have obtained a Ministry possessed of *less integrity*; but, that we

have got one of *greater ability* is not so apparent. We have indeed, Sir, secured the accession of your great abilities; but we have secured them under most distressing and embarrassing circumstances. We have procured them, incumbered with all the weakness and inefficiency of that imbecile Administration, which the country wished to see removed, not *partially*, but *totally*, and for ever, from the management of public affairs. In every other respect, we have lost more than we have gained.—At all events, if we have gained *any thing*—If your colleagues are not so *incurably* inefficient as not to impede, embarrass, and render nugatory every effort of yours—so that we *may* have procured a ministry of *greater ability*, we have indeed, as the Noble Lord *unintentionally* predicted, got one demonstrably possessing *less integrity*—the principal part of your arrangement being formed from among *those characters* in the *late* Administration, who were willing to sacrifice every *appearance* of integrity, every *feeling, sentiment*, and *opinion*, to the love of place and emolument, though obviously to be purchased at the expence of those more estimable qualities.

In considering this point, however, permit me, Sir, to remind you of the leading and most prominent, in my opinion the most conclusive argument, of the united phalanx of opposition against the late administration. When they, Sir, in proof of the exertions which they had made,

stated, that there were 400,000 men in arms, and from this inferred that they had done every thing that was necessary for the defence of the country ; —what was your reply ?—“ It is not what *has* been done, but what *might* have been done. It is not sufficient, for you say, we have done *so* much ; we have done *every thing* that was *necessary* for the protection of the country ;—you must shew that you have done *every thing* which *could* have been done, not only to provide for its present defence, but for its future security !” Let me advise you, Sir, to apply this criterion to your own conduct ;—Let me entreat you to consider, if the country required *every possible* unanimity and combination among its *ordinary* inhabitants, did it not require an *equally* unanimous understanding and concert among the *men of abilities*, by whom their exertions were to be directed ? On this principle, Have you, Sir, done *every thing* which *could* have been done to form an efficient administration ?—Have you endeavoured to provide, in this respect, not only for the present defence, but for the future security of the country ?—You cannot, even before you peruse the list of ability, talent, and integrity, which I shall submit to your consideration ;—you cannot, with all the self-love which a consciousness of your own uncommon talents may be supposed to produce ;—you cannot, even from the additional energy which you may expect the opposition, from their suggestions, to instil into your councils ;—you

cannot, with every forbearance which you may expect from those lovers of your country, and admirers of your own individual merit and abilities, who, though they disapprove of your present partial and narrow arrangement, may abstain from opposition to your measures;—you cannot, even for a moment, harbour the idea, that you have formed *an efficient*, far less that you have formed the *most efficient* administration that *might* have been formed, and which the present exigencies of the country required!

If you can possibly entertain any doubt on the subject, let me beg of you to peruse the following list, comprising the first talent and ability in the country, not comprehended in your administration, and then let me ask you, if you can, with any confidence, oppose to it those who have, by such contradictory motives, been impressed into your service? it being always understood that an opportunity presented to you, unprecedented, probably, in the annals of history; but no less desirable to the safety of these kingdoms—to combine in one, the *WHOLE talent*, as well as the *UNANIMOUS voice* of the population, of the country!

MR. FOX,	LORD GRENVILLE,	MR. WINDHAM,
MR. GREY,	MR. SHERIDAN,	MR. WHITBREAD,
MR. T. GRENVILLE;		
DUKES OF NORFOLK, BEDFORD, & DEVONSHIRE;		
EARLS FITZWILLIAM, MOIRA, SPENCER, CARLISLE,		
CARNARVON, LORD KING, &c. &c.		

and all the other first characters in the kingdom ; this, too, independent of, and; in addition to, all the strength which your own arrangement embraces, which could have proved in any respect advantageous to the country at the present moment.

While an arrangement formed on this broad and extensive basis must have insured to the country respect, attention, and confidence abroad, let us see what effects it would have produced on the minds of people of every description at home.

You cannot be ignorant, Sir, that there are many people in this country whose prosperity, nay whose only hope, depends on a restoration of peace, and who even think that this object might be attained on fair and equitable terms, did a disposition to accede to such terms manifest itself on the part of our Government. These same people, there is equally little doubt, regard you in no other light than as *a war minister*.---Mr. ADDINGTON, they must have been convinced, was inclined for peace, and would have preserved it if he could : *inefficient* therefore, as his measures were, so long as he continued in power they saw no invincible barrier to their hopes.—Your return to office, however, without any check on your actions, they must regard as a death blow to all their expectations; nor will the people in general, to whom peace must at all times be preferable to war, fail to view your aggrandisement with similar feelings. You cannot be so blindly partial to yourself as not to be conscious that your late war was unpopular

in the extreme, and that many people who have *hitherto* supported the present war, under an impression that it was a war of aggression on the part of the French Government, will not scruple *now* to affirm, that it has changed its complexion, and has, as a worthy Baronet in the House of Commons characterised the last war become *the war of the minister*. Consider, Sir, are not many even of your own friends startled, alarmed, disappointed and offended at your late conduct?—What effect then may it not be expected to produce on the minds of those who cannot be supposed to have the same confidence in our principles;—who can only judge of you from report, and who are, as is common, more disposed to put an unfavourable than a charitable construction on the motives and conduct of political men?—You must know, nay you have declared, that the most perfect unanimity---that a junction of the hand and heart of every man in the country, is necessary for our preservation at the present crisis, big with danger, and unprecedented in the annals of history. But do you think, Sir, that your recent conduct has been calculated to produce this great object?—Do you really flatter yourself that your Administration will be *more* popular, nay, that it will be *equally* popular with the *inefficient* one, which, in *name only*, you have overturned?—If you do entertain hopes so sanguine, I assure you, Sir, you are grossly deceived. The public cause of dissatisfaction is not removed; its *object only* is changed. It has for *one*

inefficient administration received *another*.---Inefficient to animate and rouse,---inefficient to regulate when so animated---the whole hearts and hands of the people of this country, at this awful moment, must be *any* administration which does not comprehend the *WHOLE talent, wisdom, and energy* of the country, and, in that way, *command* UNLIMITED public confidence! Your administration, Sir, with the exception of yourself, is *equally, if not more, weak and inefficient* than the former. Many will suspect you, *individually*, of base and unworthy motives; --those who do not, you have already found, even among your most intimate friends, are hurt and disappointed at your conduct;---and you may be assured the public indignation will rise against you in proportion as they viewed their darling object, a moderate, yet firm and energetic administration--an administration combining the whole strength, ability, and integrity of every party in Parliament---on the point of completion ---Do you suppose, Sir, that I, or any man in this country, who entertains that love for his country, that interest in its welfare, which, at a moment like the present, ought to animate every bosom, would have wished for an administration from which *you* were *especially* and *expressly* to be excluded? But, on the other hand, can we be satisfied with one which comprehends NOTHING but you!!!

What degree of unanimity too, Sir, have you to expect in Parliament? Are you not conscious that

you come into *office* the *minority* of a minority,---unaided by ANY *talent, rank, respectability, or character*,---and that, for a majority of *votes*, without principle, integrity, or ability to recommend them, you must trust to those whom you within these few weeks so violently opposed!---You will find in the Ranks of Opposition, MORE TALENT, MORE ANCIENT NOBILITY, MORE ARISTOCRATICAL DIGNITY, MORE REAL WORTH, PRINCIPLE, AND INDEPENDENCE, than any minister has ever yet had to contend against.

Think, Sir, what you are;—Think what you might have been!—Consider how high you might have stood in the eyes of this country, in the eyes of the world, as being at the head of an administration possessing the *unlimited confidence*, and comprising the *WHOLE talent* of the country:—Consider how *low* you now stand, even in the estimation of your own personal friends!—Reflect, ere it be too late.—Go to your sovereign—point out to him the impossibility of reconciling the public mind to any arrangement founded on the principle of *exclusion*—Shew him how repugnant such a sentiment is to the idea of unanimity—Tell him how contrary it is to the wishes of those whose constant care, whose most ardent wish, at this moment, is, the prosperity, honour, and independence of his crown and dignity—act thus, and there cannot be a doubt that his Majesty's paternal feeling will induce him to yield to the ardent and unanimous desire of his dutiful and affectionate subjects!

This, Sir, will be your conduct if you have come into office with clean hands and upright intentions, and this, too, cannot fail to be the result of such representations. His present Majesty, we know well, holds the inclinations of his subjects in as high regard as any of his predecessors could have done. His grand father, you cannot be ignorant, had as decided a personal dislike to your father, as his present Majesty can possibly have to Mr. Fox. The public voice, however, and the sense of Parliament taught him to conquer his prejudice, and the feelings of the man at length gave way to the duties of the king.---Make his Majesty, Sir, sensible of the public feeling at this moment.—His subjects know they feel, what will be the result. His Majesty will not prove more deaf to the entreaties of his subjects than his grand-father formerly did.—Do not mislead yourself, Sir,---Do not suppose that the public will be imposed on, and will attribute to their sovereign a decided and unalterable sentiment of *personal* dislike, which can in the most remote degree, be supposed to interfere with the interests, or even with the wishes of his people!--His majesty, we unfortunately know too well, has not of late been so intimately acquainted with the affairs of his government, and, of course, with the sentiments of his people, as every well wisher to their country could desire.—Do not you, Sir, join in any court cabal which may at present be either misrepresenting, or not fairly stating, and enforcing those sen-

timents!—Recollect, that not to state the *whole* truth is equally culpable with telling a falsehood; and that silence is, in such a case, equal to participation in the deception!—His Majesty, if at present kept in the dark, will not be allowed long to continue so!—The public will not consent to be thus duped for ever, or to allow the royal ear to be thus much longer abused!—They will themselves approach the throne and state their wishes.—They will open the eyes of his majesty to the views of his counsellors; and the royal indignation, added to public odium and disgrace, will finally, and that speedily, too, be the reward of their perfidy!

TIMOTHY PLAIN.

FINIS.



